Stanford, P. Kyle (2002) No Refuge for Realism: Selective Confirmation and the History of Science. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Realists respond to Laudan's Pessimistic Induction with what I call the selective confirmation strategy: arguing that only idle parts of past theories have been rejected, while truly success-generating features have been confirmed by further inquiry. I argue first that this strategy is unconvincing without some prospectively applicable criterion of idleness for theoretical posits, and second, that existing efforts to provide one either convict all theoretical posits of idleness (Kitcher) or stand refuted by detailed consideration of the very examples (optical/electromagnetic ether, caloric fluid) to which they appeal (Psillos). Additionally, available avenues for improving on these proposals are unpromising.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Stanford, P. Kyle
Keywords:	Realism
Depositing User:	Program Committee
Date Deposited:	23 Mar 2003
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID:	1098
Date:	2002
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1098

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