Elga, Adam (2014) Bayesian humility. [Preprint]
There is a more recent version of this item available. |
|
PDF
bayesian-humility.pdf - Submitted Version Download (133kB) |
Abstract
Say that an agent is "epistemically humble" if she is less than certain that her opinions will converge to the truth, given an appropriate stream of evidence. Is such humility rationally permissible? According to the orgulity argument (Belot 2013): the answer is "yes" but long-run convergence-to-the-truth theorems force Bayesians to answer "no." That argument has no force against Bayesians who reject countable additivity as a requirement of rationality. Such Bayesians are free to count even extreme humility as rationally permissible.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Creators: |
|
||||||
Additional Information: | This version fixes a few typographical and thoughtographical errors in the proofs in the technical appendices. | ||||||
Keywords: | Bayesianism, orgulity, convergence to the truth, convergence theorem, washing out, finite additivity, finitely additive probability, countable additivity, problem of priors | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
||||||
Depositing User: | Adam Elga | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 02 Sep 2014 14:49 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 27 Sep 2015 16:42 | ||||||
Item ID: | 11002 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics |
||||||
Date: | 25 July 2014 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11002 |
Available Versions of this Item
-
Bayesian humility. (deposited 18 Aug 2014 19:06)
- Bayesian humility. (deposited 02 Sep 2014 14:49) [Currently Displayed]
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
View Item |