Votsis, Ioannis (2002) Is Structure Not Enough? [Preprint]

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Abstract

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part presents one of Bertrand Russell`s lesser-known epistemological views, viz. `structural realism` (SR). In short, this position holds that at most we have knowledge of the structure of the external (i.e. physical) world. This is followed by an exposition of M.H.A. Newman`s allegedly fatal objection that SR is either trivial or false. The second part starts with a brief mention of the current state of SR. Appealing to Quine`s notion of ontological relativity, the author argues that SR is impervious to Newman`s objection for it is neither trivial nor false.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Votsis, Ioannis
Keywords:	Realism/Anti-Realism, Philosophers of Science, Structural Realism
Depositing User:	Program Committee
Date Deposited:	23 Mar 2003
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:11
Item ID:	1101
Date:	2002
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1101

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