Schindler, Samuel (2014) Scientific discovery: that-what’s and what-that’s. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper I defend Kuhn’s view of scientific discovery, which involves two central tenets, namely (i) that a scientific discovery always requires a discovery-that (i.e., the observation of X) and a discovery-what (i.e., the correct conceptualisation of X), and (ii) that there are two kinds of scientific discovery, resulting from the temporal order of the discovery-that and the discovery-what. I identify two problems with Kuhn’s account and offer solutions to them from a realist stance. Alternatives to Kuhn’s account are also discussed.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Schindler, Samuel samuel.schindler@css.au.dk
Keywords:	discovery, Kuhn, essence, science, theory-ladenness
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Explanation General Issues > History of Science Case Studies General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory/Observation
Depositing User:	Samuel Schindler
Date Deposited:	27 Oct 2014 15:21
Last Modified:	27 Oct 2014 15:21
Item ID:	11090
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Explanation General Issues > History of Science Case Studies General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory/Observation
Date:	2014
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11090

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