Mizrahi, Moti (2015) Historical Inductions, Unconceived Alternatives, and Unconceived Objections. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this paper, I outline a reductio against Stanford’s “New Induction” on the History of Science, which is an inductive argument against scientific realism that is based on what Stanford (2006) calls “the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives” (PUA). From the supposition that Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science is cogent, and the parallel New Induction on the History of Philosophy (Mizrahi 2014), it follows that scientific antirealism is not worthy of belief. I also show that denying a key premise in the reductio only forces antirealists who endorse Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science into a dilemma: either antirealism falls under the axe of Stanford’s New Induction on the History of Science or it falls under the axe of the New Induction on the History of Philosophy.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
Keywords:	antirealism; new induction; pessimistic induction; problem of unconceived alternatives; problem of unconceived objections; scientific realism
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	16 May 2015 13:47
Last Modified:	16 May 2015 13:47
Item ID:	11463
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	5 May 2015
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11463

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