Mizrahi, Moti (2015) Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-Picking. [Preprint]

PDF Hist_Indc_ISPS_final.pdf - Accepted Version Download (475kB)

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that arguments from the history of science against scientific realism, like the arguments advanced by Kyle Stanford and Peter Vickers, are fallacious. The so-called “Old Induction,” like Vickers’, and the so-called “New Induction,” like Stanford’s, are both guilty of confirmation bias, specifically, of cherry-picking evidence that allegedly challenges scientific realism, while ignoring evidence to the contrary. I also show that the historical episodes Stanford adduces in support of his New Induction are indeterminate between a pessimistic interpretation and an optimistic interpretation. For these reasons, these arguments are fallacious, and thus do not pose a serious challenge to scientific realism.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Keywords:	antirealism; new induction; old induction; pessimistic induction; problem of unconceived alternatives; scientific realism
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Science Case Studies General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	14 Nov 2015 18:29
Last Modified:	14 Nov 2015 18:29
Item ID:	11761
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Science Case Studies General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	13 November 2015
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11761

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item