Ivanova, Milena
(2015)
Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science.
Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science, 52.
pp. 114-122.
Abstract
Poincaré is well known for his conventionalism and structuralism. However, the
relationship between these two theses and their place in Poincaré’s epistemology of science remain puzzling. In this paper I show the scope of Poincaré’s conventionalism and its position in Poincaré’s hierarchical approach to scientific theories. I argue that for Poincaré scientific knowledge is relational and made possible by synthetic a priori, empirical and conventional elements, which, however, are not chosen arbitrarily. By examining his geometric conventionalism, his hierarchical account of science and defence of continuity in theory change, I argue that Poincaré defends a complex structuralist position based on synthetic a priori and conventional elements, the mind-dependence of which departs him from metaphysical realism.
Item Type: |
Published Article or Volume
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Creators: |
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Keywords: |
Conventionalism, Henri Poincaré, Neo-Kantianism, Structural Realism,
Synthetic A Priori |
Depositing User: |
Dr Milena Ivanova
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Date Deposited: |
15 Dec 2015 13:47 |
Last Modified: |
15 Dec 2015 13:47 |
Item ID: |
11813 |
Journal or Publication Title: |
Conventionalism, structuralism and neo-Kantianism in Poincaré׳s philosophy of science |
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Official URL: |
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S... |
Date: |
2015 |
Page Range: |
pp. 114-122 |
Volume: |
52 |
URI: |
https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11813 |
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