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The Quantum Mechanical Frame of Reference Part 1: QBism and Psi-Ontology

Soltau, Andrew (2015) The Quantum Mechanical Frame of Reference Part 1: QBism and Psi-Ontology. [Preprint]

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Abstract

QBism explicitly takes the subjective view: probabilities of events are defined solely by past experiences, i.e. the record of observations. As shown by the authors (Fuchs et al, 2013), this: “... removes the paradoxes, conundra, and pseudo-problems that have plagued quantum foundations for the past nine decades”. It is criticised for its lack of ontology and anthropocentric nature. However, if Everett's (1957) formulation is taken at face value, exactly the features of QBism are the result, and the ontology is inherent. The anthropocentric nature of the solution is simply an indication that the quantum state is relative, as is central to Everett. Problems of measurement and locality do not arise.
As described by Tegmark (1997), Everett defines the relationship between two fundamentally different views of the world, different types of frame of reference. The outside view is defined by the unitary wave function, the inside view by the record of observations. As Lockwood (1989) states, the preferred basis problem is fully resolved if the latter is taken as the basis. Taken literally, only that defined by the record of observations is determinate in the physical world of this inside view. The reality of QBism is the result. The same can be derived from first principles in the no-collapse universe. Taking the outside view to define all possible decoherent quasi-classical worlds, the physical world of the inside view is the superposition of all such worlds in which it is instantiated. In this quantum mechanical frame of reference only that observed is determinate.
The quantum state as ontology is questioned because it defines only the linear dynamics and cannot account for collapse. No deeper reality is required, however: the inside view, and the collapse dynamics that operates in this type of frame of reference, are emergent properties of the system, and operate at a different level of logical type. The world operates as described by QBism, but is nonetheless defined by the quantum state.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Soltau, Andrewandrewsoltau@gmail.com
Keywords: Quantum mechanics, Everett, Relative state, Tegmark, Rovelli, Relational quantum mechanics, Quantum concept of time, Measurement problem, Relativity, Frame of reference
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Depositing User: Andrew Soltau
Date Deposited: 20 Mar 2025 14:45
Last Modified: 20 Mar 2025 14:45
Item ID: 11837
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Quantum Mechanics
Date: 31 December 2015
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/11837

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