O'Connor, Cailin (2014) Ambiguity is Kinda Good, Sometimes. [Preprint]
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PDF (Published in Philosophy of Science, 2015)
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Abstract
Santana (2014) shows that in common interest signaling games when signals are costly and when receivers can observe contextual environmental cues, ambiguous signaling strategies outperform precise ones and can, as a result, evolve. In this note, I show that if one assumes realistic structure on the state space of a common interest signaling game, ambiguous strategies can be explained without appeal to contextual cues. I conclude by arguing that there are multiple types of cases of payoff beneficial ambiguity, some of which are better explained by Santana's models and some of which are better explained by the models presented here.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | evolutionary game theory, decision theory, sim-max game, signaling, ambiguity, language, evolution, evolution of language | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Cailin O'Connor | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 12 Apr 2016 22:48 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 12 Apr 2016 22:48 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 12037 | ||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Biology > Evolutionary Theory Specific Sciences > Economics Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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| Date: | 2014 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12037 |
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