Saatsi, Juha (2016) What is theoretical progress of science? [Preprint]

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Abstract

The epistemic conception of scientific progress equates progress with accumulation of scientific knowledge. I argue that the epistemic conception fails to fully capture scientific progress: theoretical progress, in particular, can transcend scientific knowledge in important ways. Sometimes theoretical progress can be a ma er of new theories 'latching better onto unobservable reality' in a way that need not be a matter of new knowledge. Recognising this further dimension of theoretical progress is particularly significant for understanding scientific realism, since realism is naturally construed as the claim that science makes theoretical progress. Some prominent realist positions (regarding fundamental physics, in particular) are best understood in terms of commitment to theoretical progress that cannot be equated with accumulation of scientific knowledge.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Saatsi, Juha J.T.Saatsi@leeds.ac.uk
Additional Information:	Forthcoming in Synthese
Keywords:	Scientific Realism, scientific progress, Bird
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Depositing User:	Juha Saatsi
Date Deposited:	11 May 2016 21:03
Last Modified:	11 May 2016 21:03
Item ID:	12086
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change
Date:	2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12086

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