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Time for empiricist metaphysics

Brading, Katherine (2016) Time for empiricist metaphysics. [Preprint]

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Abstract

I discuss the three distinctions “absolute and relative”, “true and apparent”, and “mathematical and common”, for the specific case of time in Newton’s Principia. I argue that all three distinctions are needed for the project of the Principia and can be understood within the context of that project without appeal to Newton’s wider metaphysical and theological commitments. I argue that, within the context of the Principia, the three claims that time is absolute rather than relative, true rather than apparent, and mathematical rather than common, are to be evaluated with respect to the needs of, and relative to the success of, the project of the Principia. I claim that Newton is thereby offering a new, and empirical, philosophy of time.

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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Brading, Katherinekbrading@nd.edu
Keywords: Newton; absolute time; absolute motion; true time; mathematical time; Schliesser; empiricist metaphysics
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics
Depositing User: Katherine A. Brading
Date Deposited: 29 Jun 2016 15:20
Last Modified: 29 Jun 2016 15:20
Item ID: 12233
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Physics > Classical Physics
General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science
Specific Sciences > Physics
Date: 28 June 2016
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12233

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