Climenhaga, Nevin (2016) How Explanation Guides Confirmation. Philosophy of Science.

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Abstract

Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H|O&E) = P(H|O). In this paper I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Climenhaga, Nevin nclimenh@nd.edu
Keywords:	Bayesianism Confirmation Evidence Explanation Inference to the Best Explanation Probability William Roche Elliott Sober
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Nevin Climenhaga
Date Deposited:	17 Jan 2017 15:22
Last Modified:	17 Jan 2017 15:22
Item ID:	12755
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Science
Official URL:	http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/6...
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1086/690723
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12755

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