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The No Miracles Argument without the Base Rate Fallacy

Dawid, Richard and Hartmann, Stephan (2017) The No Miracles Argument without the Base Rate Fallacy. [Preprint]

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Abstract

According to an argument by Colin Howson, the no-miracles argument (NMA) is contingent on committing the base-rate fallacy and is therefore bound to fail. We demonstrate that Howson's argument only applies to one of two versions of the NMA. The other, more considerate version remains unaffected by his line of reasoning. We provide a formal reconstruction of that version of the NMA and show that it is valid. Finally, we demonstrate that the use of subjective priors is consistent with the realist implication of the NMA and show that a core worry with respect to the suggested form of the NMA can be dispelled.

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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Dawid, Richardrichard.dawid@philosophy.su.se0000-0002-1472-2958
Hartmann, StephanS.Hartmann@lmu.de
Keywords: Bayesianism, no miracles argument, realism, base rate fallacy
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User: Dr. Richard Dawid
Date Deposited: 27 Mar 2017 13:20
Last Modified: 27 Mar 2017 13:20
Item ID: 12939
Subjects: General Issues > Confirmation/Induction
General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date: 20 March 2017
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/12939

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