Eva, Benjamin and Hartmann, Stephan (2017) When No Reason For Is A Reason Against. [Preprint]
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Abstract
We provide a Bayesian justification of the idea that, under certain conditions, the absence of an argument in favour of the truth of a hypothesis H constitutes a good argument against the truth of H.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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| Keywords: | Bayesian Epistemology, Argumentation | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | |||||||||
| Depositing User: | Dr Benjamin Eva | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 29 Jun 2017 14:27 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 29 Jun 2017 14:27 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 13167 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | |||||||||
| Date: | 29 June 2017 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/13167 |
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