Moretti, Luca (2003) Why the Converse Consequence Condition cannot be accepted. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Three confirmation principles discussed by Hempel are the Converse Consequence Condition, the Special Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition. Le Morvan (1999) has argued that, when the choice among confirmation principles is just about them, it is the Converse Consequence Condition that must be rejected. In this paper, I make this argument definitive. In doing that, I will provide an indisputable proof that the simple conjunction of the Converse Consequence Condition and the Entailment Condition yields a disastrous consequence.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | This paper was published in Analysis 63, 4 (2003). | ||||||
| Keywords: | Converse Consequence Condition, confirmation principle, paradox, hypothetico-deductivism, Hempel, Le Morvan. | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
| Depositing User: | Luca Moretti | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 22 Sep 2003 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:12 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 1402 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
| Date: | June 2003 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1402 |
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