Bokulich, Alisa
(2016)
Fiction As a Vehicle for Truth: Moving Beyond the Ontic Conception.
The Monist, 99 (3).
pp. 260-279.
Abstract
Despite widespread evidence that fictional models play an explanatory role in science,
resistance remains to the idea that fictions can explain. A central source of this resistance
is a particular view about what explanations are, namely, the ontic conception of
explanation. According to the ontic conception, explanations just are the concrete entities
in the world. I argue this conception is ultimately incoherent and that even a weaker
version of the ontic conception fails. Fictional models can succeed in offering genuine
explanations by correctly capturing relevant patterns of counterfactual dependence and
licensing correct inferences. Using the example of Newtonian force explanations of the
tides, I show how, even in science, fiction can be a vehicle for truth.
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
![[feed]](http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/style/images/feed-icon-32x32.png){kind=icon}