Pérez Otero, Manuel (2018) The Domain of the Mental in Williamson’s Philosophy. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33 (1). pp. 23-40. ISSN 2171-679X
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Abstract
For Williamson, knowing and believing are mental states, but believing truly and justifiedly-and-truly believing are non-mental states. This discriminatory approach is relevant to his epistemology: his main negative epistemological thesis (on the alleged impossibility of defining knowledge in accordance with a traditional scheme) and his main positive epistemological thesis (his own alternative definition of knowledge) depend on his metaphysical theory about the demarcation of the mental. I present here a problem for Williamson’s theory of the mental: it imposes implausible restrictions on possible uses of concepts and linguistic expressions. I will describe some options that Williamson would have at his disposal to evade the problem; but I maintain that these options carry some degree of arbitrariness.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | ISSN: 0495-4548 (print) | ||||||
| Keywords: | definitions of knowledge; true belief; mental concepts; factive states; conjunctive concepts | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Depositing User: | Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 14 Mar 2018 21:23 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 14 Mar 2018 21:23 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 14464 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science | ||||||
| Publisher: | Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco | ||||||
| Official URL: | http://www.ehu.eus/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/v... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1387/theoria.17629 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Philosophers of Science |
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| Date: | January 2018 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 23-40 | ||||||
| Volume: | 33 | ||||||
| Number: | 1 | ||||||
| ISSN: | 2171-679X | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14464 |
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