Eagle, Antony (2003) Pragmatic Causation. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Two arguments due to Russell are examined, and found to show that the notion of causation as full determination doesn’t mesh easily with deterministic global physics and the distinction between effective and ineffective strategies. But a local notion of causation as involving a certain kind of counterfactual dependence is, I argue, compatible with Russell’s conclusions. I defend it from a resurgent form of Russell’s microphysical determinism argument by deploying a pragmatic account of the nature and function of scientific theories.

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Item Type:	Other
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Eagle, Antony
Keywords:	pragmatism causation
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Depositing User:	Antony Eagle
Date Deposited:	13 Nov 2003
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID:	1468
Public Domain:	No
Subjects:	General Issues > Causation General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Date:	2003
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1468

Available Versions of this Item

• Russell, Causation, Determinism. (deposited 31 Jul 2003)
  • Pragmatic Causation. (deposited 13 Nov 2003) [Currently Displayed]

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