Saatsi, Juha (2018) Realism and Explanatory Perspectives. [Preprint]
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Abstract
This paper defends a (minimal) realist conception of progress in scientific understanding in the face of the ubiquitous plurality of perspectives in science. The argument turns on the counterfactual-dependence framework of explanation and understanding, which is illustrated and evidenced with reference to different explanations of the rainbow.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Additional Information: | Forthcoming in M. Massimi and C.D. McCoy (eds.), Understanding Perspectivism: Scientific Challenges and Methodological Prospects, Routledge. | ||||||
Keywords: | Scientific Realism Perspectivism Understanding | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change |
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Depositing User: | Juha Saatsi | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 18 May 2018 18:59 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 18 May 2018 18:59 | ||||||
Item ID: | 14689 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory Change |
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Date: | 18 May 2018 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/14689 |
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