Leefmann, Jon and Lesle, Steffen (2018) Knowledge from Scientific Expert Testimony without Epistemic Trust. [Preprint]

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Abstract

This is a pre-print of an article published in Synthese. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01908-w

In this paper we address the question of how it can be possible for a non-expert to acquire justified true belief from expert testimony. We discuss reductionism and epistemic trust as theoretical approaches to answer this question and present a novel solution that avoids major problems of both theoretical options: Performative Expert Testimony (PET). PET draws on a functional account of expertise insofar as it takes the expert’s visibility as a good informant capable to satisfy informational needs as equally important as her specific skills and knowledge. We explain how PET generates justification for testimonial belief, which is at once assessable for non-experts and maintains the division of epistemic labor between them and the experts. Thereafter we defend PET against two objections. First, we point out that the non-expert’s interest in acquiring widely assertable true beliefs and the expert’s interest in maintaining her status as a good informant counterbalances the relativist account of justification at work in PET. Second, we show that with regard to the interests at work in testimonial exchanges between experts and non-experts, PET yields a better explanation of knowledge-acquisition from expert testimony than externalist accounts of justification such as reliabilism. As our arguments ground in a conception of knowledge, which conceives of belief-justification as a declarative speech act, throughout the rearmost sections of this paper we also indicate to how such a conception is operationalized in PET.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Leefmann, Jon jon.leefmann@fau.de 0000-0001-5475-990X Lesle, Steffen steffen.lesle@fau.de 0000-0002-4165-4452
Keywords:	Expert knowledge, performative testimony, epistemic justification, assertability, epistemic community
Subjects:	General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Rhetoric of Science General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Mr. Steffen Lesle
Date Deposited:	06 Sep 2018 14:47
Last Modified:	06 Sep 2018 14:47
Item ID:	15009
DOI or Unique Handle:	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01908-w”
Subjects:	General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Rhetoric of Science General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	6 September 2018
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15009

Available Versions of this Item

• Knowledge from Scientific Expert Testimony without Epistemic Trust. (deposited 20 Aug 2018 01:15)
  • Knowledge from Scientific Expert Testimony without Epistemic Trust. (deposited 21 Aug 2018 15:06)
    • Knowledge from Scientific Expert Testimony without Epistemic Trust. (deposited 06 Sep 2018 14:47) [Currently Displayed]

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