Szabo, Laszlo E. (2019) Intrinsic, extrinsic, and the constitutive a priori. [Preprint]
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Abstract
On the basis of what I call physico-formalist philosophy of mathematics, I will develop an amended account of the Kantian–Reichenbachian conception of constitutive a priori. It will be shown that the features (attributes, qualities, properties) attributed to a real object are not possessed by the object as a “thing-in-itself”; they require a physical theory by means of which these features are constituted. It will be seen that the existence of such a physical theory implies that a physical object can possess a property only if other contingently existing physical objects exist; therefore, the intrinsic–extrinsic distinction is flawed.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | Reichenbach, constitutive a priori, physicalism, formalism, meaning, truth, holism, intrinsic property | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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Depositing User: | Prof. Laszlo E. Szabo | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 08 Jan 2019 02:58 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 08 Jan 2019 02:58 | ||||||
Item ID: | 15567 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Scientific Metaphysics General Issues > Operationalism/Instrumentalism General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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Date: | 6 January 2019 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15567 |
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