Scorzato, Luigi (2015) Science and Illusions. [Preprint]
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Abstract
It is mostly agreed that Popper's criterion of falsifiability fails to provide a useful demarcation between science and pseudo-science, because ad-hoc assumptions are always able to save any theory that conflicts with the empirical data (a.k.a. Duhem-Quine problem), and a characterization of ad-hoc assumptions is lacking. Moreover, adding some testable predictions is not very difficult. It should be emphasized that the Duhem-Quine argument does not simply make the demarcation approximate (if it were so, all our problems would be solved!), but it makes it totally useless. Indeed, no philosophical criterion of demarcation is presently able to rule out even some of the most blatant cases of pseudo-science, not even approximatively (in any well defined sense of approximation). This is in sharp contrast with our firm belief that some theories are clearly not scientific. Where does this belief come from? In this paper I argue that it is necessary and possible to recognize the notion of syntactic simplicity that is able to tell the difference between empirically equivalent scientific and non-scientific theories, with a precision that is adequate to many important practical purposes, and it fully agrees with the judgments generally held in the scientific community.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Additional Information: | inexact statement corrected (Jan 2019) | ||||||
Keywords: | Demarcation, pseudoscience, simplicity | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Values In Science |
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Depositing User: | Dr. Luigi Scorzato | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 08 Jan 2019 02:59 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 08 Jan 2019 02:59 | ||||||
Item ID: | 15570 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Science vs. Pseudoscience General Issues > Structure of Theories General Issues > Theory Change General Issues > Values In Science |
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Date: | 10 August 2015 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15570 |
Available Versions of this Item
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Science and Illusions. (deposited 12 Aug 2015 16:25)
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Science and Illusions. (deposited 03 Apr 2016 18:52)
- Science and Illusions. (deposited 08 Jan 2019 02:59) [Currently Displayed]
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Science and Illusions. (deposited 03 Apr 2016 18:52)
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