Park, Seungbae (2016) Against Mathematical Convenientism.

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Abstract

Indispensablists argue that when our belief system conflicts with our experiences, we can negate a mathematical belief but we do not because if we do, we would have to make an excessive revision of our belief system. Thus, we retain a mathematical belief not because we have good evidence for it but because it is convenient to do so. I call this view ‘mathematical convenientism.’ I argue that mathematical convenientism commits the consequential fallacy and that it demolishes the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument and Baker’s enhanced indispensability argument.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Park, Seungbae
Keywords:	Mathematical Confirmationism, Mathematical Convenientism, Indispensability Argument, Mathematical Realism
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Depositing User:	Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited:	21 Jan 2019 01:09
Last Modified:	21 Jan 2019 01:09
Item ID:	15618
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Mathematics > Epistemology
Date:	2016
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15618

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