Dardashti, Radin and Hartmann, Stephan (2019) Assessing Scientific Theories: The Bayesian Approach. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Scientists use a variety of methods to assess their theories. While experimental testing remains the gold standard, several other more controversial methods have been proposed, especially in fundamental physics. Amongst these methods are the use of analogue experiments and so-called non-empirical ways of theory-assessment such as the No Alternatives Argument. But how can these methods themselves be assessed? Are they reliable guides to the truth, or are they of no help at all when it comes to assessing scientific theories? In this chapter, we develop a general Bayesian framework to scrutinize these new (as well as standard empirical) methods of assessing scientific theories and illustrate the proposed methodology by two detailed case studies. This allows us to explore under which conditions nontraditional ways of assessing scientific theories are successful and what can be done to improve them.
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Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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Keywords: | Bayesian Confirmation, Theory Assessment, Analogue Experiments, No Alternatives Argument | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence Specific Sciences > Physics |
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Depositing User: | Dr. Radin Dardashti | |||||||||
Date Deposited: | 11 Apr 2019 13:02 | |||||||||
Last Modified: | 12 Jul 2024 16:59 | |||||||||
Item ID: | 15896 | |||||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence Specific Sciences > Physics |
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Date: | 2019 | |||||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/15896 |
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