Khalifa, Kareem (2019) Is Verstehen Scientific Understanding? Philosophy of the social sciences, 49 (4). pp. 282-306.
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Abstract
Many have argued that the human sciences feature a unique form of understanding (Verstehen) that is absent from the natural sciences. However, in the last decade or so, epistemologists and philosophers of natural science have been proffering analyses of a kind of natural-scientific understanding. Using examples from educational psychology and anthropology, I argue that there are prima facie reasons to think these recent accounts of natural-scientific understanding impose necessary conditions on Verstehen. This suggests that any claim about Verstehen’s distinctiveness faces hitherto-unappreciated burdens of proof.
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Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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Keywords: | understanding, social science, anthropology, Verstehen | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Anthropology General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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Depositing User: | Dr. Kareem Khalifa | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 23 Jul 2019 04:17 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 23 Jul 2019 04:17 | ||||||
Item ID: | 16248 | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Philosophy of the social sciences | ||||||
Official URL: | https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/004839311... | ||||||
DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1177/0048393119847104 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Anthropology General Issues > Explanation Specific Sciences > Psychology |
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Date: | 15 May 2019 | ||||||
Page Range: | pp. 282-306 | ||||||
Volume: | 49 | ||||||
Number: | 4 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16248 |
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