Franceschi, Paul (2004) A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. [Preprint]

Preview

PDF doomsday-en.pdf Download (190kB)

Abstract

In this paper, I present a solution to the Doomsday argument based on a third type of solution, by contrast to on the one hand, the Carter-Leslie view and on the other hand, the Eckhardt et al. analysis. I begin by strengthening both competing models by highlighting some variations of their ancestors models, which renders them less vulnerable to some objections. I describe then a third line of solution, which incorporates insights from both Leslie and Eckhardt's models and fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to DA. I argue then that this two-sided analogy also holds when one takes into account the issue of indeterminism and the reference class problem. This leads finally to a novel formulation of the argument that could well be more consensual than the original one.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Franceschi, Paul
Keywords:	Doomsday argument, indeterminism, probability theory, analogy
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Depositing User:	Paul Franceschi
Date Deposited:	26 Feb 2004
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID:	1631
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Determinism/Indeterminism
Date:	February 2004
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1631

Available Versions of this Item

• A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 24 May 2003)
  • A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 26 Feb 2004) [Currently Displayed]
    • A Third Route to the Doomsday Argument. (deposited 02 Sep 2004)

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item