Moretti, Luca (2004) Why Lewis', Shogenji's and Fitelsons's notions of coherence cannot be accepted. [Preprint]
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Abstract
In this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Keywords: | Coherence, coherence measure, Bayesian coherence, Lewis, Fitelson, Shogenji | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
Depositing User: | Luca Moretti | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 26 Feb 2004 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:12 | ||||||
Item ID: | 1635 | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction | ||||||
Date: | January 2004 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1635 |
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