Park, Seungbae (2019) Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress. [Preprint]

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Abstract

The epistemic account and the noetic account hold that the essence of scientific progress is the increase in knowledge and understanding, respectively. Dellsén (2018) criticizes the epistemic account (Park, 2017a) and defends the noetic account (Dellsén, 2016). I argue that Dellsén’s criticisms against the epistemic account fail, and that his notion of understanding, which he claims requires neither belief nor justification, cannot explain scientific progress, although it can explain fictional progress in science-fiction.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Park, Seungbae
Keywords:	Cognitive Episode, Means-End Thesis, Non-Cognitive Episode, Restriction Thesis
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Seungbae Park
Date Deposited:	25 Aug 2019 01:55
Last Modified:	25 Aug 2019 01:55
Item ID:	16365
Subjects:	General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16365

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• Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress. (deposited 25 Aug 2019 01:55) [Currently Displayed]
  • Scientific Understanding, Fictional Understanding, and Scientific Progress. (deposited 29 Mar 2020 03:53)

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