Johannesson, Eric (2019) Classical vs. Bayesian statistics. [Preprint]

Preview

Text classical_vs_bayesian_statistics.pdf Download (497kB) | Preview

Abstract

In statistics, there are two main paradigms: classical and Bayesian statistics. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent to which classicists and Bayesians can (in some suitable sense of the word) agree. My conclusion is that, in certain situations, they can't. The upshot is that, if we assume that the classicist isn't allowed to have a higher degree of belief (credence) in a null hypothesis after he has rejected it than before, then (in certain situations), either he has to have trivial or incoherent credences to begin with, or fail to update his credences by conditionalization.

---

Export/Citation:

EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL

Social Networking:

Share |

---

Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Johannesson, Eric johannesson.eric@gmail.com 0000-0001-9128-2565
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User:	Dr. Eric Johannesson
Date Deposited:	04 Sep 2019 03:44
Last Modified:	04 Sep 2019 03:44
Item ID:	16401
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date:	2019
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16401

Available Versions of this Item

• Classical vs. Bayesian statistics. (deposited 04 Sep 2019 03:44) [Currently Displayed]
  • Classical vs. Bayesian statistics. (deposited 15 Dec 2019 03:12)

Monthly Views for the past 3 years

Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years

Plum Analytics

Actions (login required)

View Item