Broessel, Peter (2013) The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux. Philosophy of Science, 80 (3). pp. 378-397. ISSN 1539-767X

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Abstract

Fitelson (1999) demonstrates that the validity of various arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory depends on which confirmation mea- sure is adopted. The present paper adds to the results set out in Fitelson (1999), expanding on them in two principal respects. First, it considers more confirmation measures. Second, it shows that there are important arguments within Bayesian confirmation theory and that there is no con- firmation measure that renders them all valid. Finally, the paper reviews the ramifications that this ”strengthened problem of measure sensitivity” has for Bayesian confirmation theory and discusses whether it points at pluralism about notions of confirmation.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Broessel, Peter
Keywords:	Confirmation Theory, Bayesian Epistemology, Probability Theory
Depositing User:	Dr Peter Brössel
Date Deposited:	14 Oct 2019 03:45
Last Modified:	14 Oct 2019 03:45
Item ID:	16532
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Science
Publisher:	University of Chicago Press
Official URL:	https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/671172?seq=1#...
Date:	2013
Page Range:	pp. 378-397
Volume:	80
Number:	3
ISSN:	1539-767X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16532

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