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'Ramseyfying' Probabilistic Comparativism

Elliott, Edward (2019) 'Ramseyfying' Probabilistic Comparativism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more confident that P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief (e.g., believing that P with some strength x). In this paper, I outline the basis for a new, non-probabilistic version of comparativism inspired by a suggestion made by Frank Ramsey in `Probability and Partial Belief'. I show how, and to what extent, `Ramseyan comparativism' might be used to weaken the (unrealistically strong) probabilistic coherence conditions that comparativism traditionally relies on.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Elliott, EdwardE.J.R.Elliott@leeds.ac.uk0000-0002-4387-7967
Additional Information: Accepted for publication at Philosophy of Science
Keywords: comparativism; probability; partial belief; Ramsey
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Dr Edward Elliott
Date Deposited: 05 Nov 2019 03:03
Last Modified: 05 Nov 2019 03:03
Item ID: 16612
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2019
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16612

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