Gomez-Marin, Alex and Arnau, Juan (2019) The False Problem of Consciousness. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Philosophers have usually dealt with the problem of consciousness but, in the last decades, neurobiologists have undertaken the daunting task to address it scientifically. In particular, to answer how the brain produces consciousness. Here we question whether it actually does so, seeking to articulate the precise relation between neural activity and subjective experience. There is no doubt that they are intimately related. However, we argue that the thesis of parallelism (that consciousness tells no more than what is going on in the brain, but only in a different language), rather than enunciating an empirical fact, betrays a philosophical commitment. In addition, such equivalence between mental and cerebral states can be shown to lead to self-contradictions (the brain produces the world with itself in it; the brain, as an object in conscious experience, gives rise to conscious experience). Our approach endorses an integration of philosophical and scientific efforts where the scientist seeks to obtain empirically expedient answers to questions that the philosopher has previously formulated in a conceptually precise manner. Namely, that the questions we ask warrant the answers we provide. We posit that the success of an interdisciplinary quest for consciousness hinges on two more challenges: to accept negative proofs as ways forward and, especially, to avoid presenting metaphysical positions as scientific results. Differentiating between solidarity (as brain lesions demonstrate) and equivalence (as no data does) offers an alternative point of departure for understanding consciousness that does not, from the outset, outlay a false problem. The “easy problem” is hard-enough for the “hard problem” to be ill-posed.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | |||||||||
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| Keywords: | consciousness, neuroscience, philosophy of mind, brain-mind relation | |||||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Neuroscience General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Reductionism/Holism |
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| Depositing User: | Dr. Alex Gomez-Marin | |||||||||
| Date Deposited: | 11 Jan 2020 02:34 | |||||||||
| Last Modified: | 11 Jan 2020 02:34 | |||||||||
| Item ID: | 16804 | |||||||||
| Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Neuroscience General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Reductionism/Holism |
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| Date: | 31 January 2019 | |||||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16804 |
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The False Problem of Consciousness. (deposited 02 Feb 2019 05:13)
- The False Problem of Consciousness. (deposited 11 Jan 2020 02:34) [Currently Displayed]
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