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Objectivity and the Method of Arbitrary Functions

de Canson, Chloé (2020) Objectivity and the Method of Arbitrary Functions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. ISSN 1464-3537

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Abstract

There is widespread excitement in the literature about the method of arbitrary functions: many take it to show that it is from the dynamics of systems that the objectivity of probabilities emerge. In this paper, I differentiate three ways in which a probability function might be objective, and I argue that the method of arbitrary functions cannot help us show that dynamics objectivise probabilities in any of these senses.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
de Canson, Chloé
Keywords: Method of Arbitrary Functions Objective probability Objective chance Epistemic chance
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Depositing User: Chloé de Canson
Date Deposited: 13 Jan 2020 00:04
Last Modified: 13 Jan 2020 00:04
Item ID: 16808
Journal or Publication Title: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
DOI or Unique Handle: axaa001
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics
Date: 2020
ISSN: 1464-3537
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16808

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