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Three ways of worrying about 'causation'

Spurrett, David and Ross, Don (2004) Three ways of worrying about 'causation'. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Our point of departure is Russell’s (1913) argument for the ‘complete extrusion’ of the word ‘cause’ from the philosophical vocabulary. We argue that at least three different types of philosophical project concerning ‘cause’ should be carefully distinguished, and that failures to distinguish them lie at the root of some apparently recalcitrant problems. We call them the ‘cognitive’, the ‘scientific’ and the ‘metaphysical’.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Spurrett, David
Ross, Don
Keywords: Causation, information, anticipation, metaphysics of causation
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Depositing User: David Jon Spurrett
Date Deposited: 29 Mar 2004
Last Modified: 07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID: 1685
Subjects: General Issues > Causation
Date: February 2004
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1685

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