Ruyant, Quentin (2020) Semantic Realism in the Semantic Conception of Theories. Synthese. ISSN 1573-0964
|
Text
semanticRealismRevision2.pdf Download (159kB) | Preview |
|
Other (Plain Text Bibliography)
bibliography.txt - Bibliography Download (5kB) |
Abstract
Semantic realism can be characterised as the idea that scientic theories are truth-bearers, and that they are true or false in virtue of the world. This notion is often assumed, but rarely discussed in the literature. I examine how it fares in the context of the semantic view of theories and in connection with the literature on scientic representation. Making sense of semantic realism requires specifying the conditions of application of theoretical models, even for models that are not actually used, which leads to several diculties. My conclusion is that semantic realism is far more demanding than one would expect. Finally, I briey examine some pragmatist alternatives.
Export/Citation: | EndNote | BibTeX | Dublin Core | ASCII/Text Citation (Chicago) | HTML Citation | OpenURL |
Social Networking: |
Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Creators: |
|
||||||
Keywords: | Semantic realism Pragmatism Scientific realism Scientific representation Semantic conception of theories | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory/Observation |
||||||
Depositing User: | Mr. Quentin Ruyant | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 30 Jan 2020 00:12 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 30 Jan 2020 00:12 | ||||||
Item ID: | 16859 | ||||||
Journal or Publication Title: | Synthese | ||||||
Publisher: | Springer (Springer Science+Business Media B.V.) | ||||||
Subjects: | General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism General Issues > Theory/Observation |
||||||
Date: | January 2020 | ||||||
ISSN: | 1573-0964 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/16859 |
Monthly Views for the past 3 years
Monthly Downloads for the past 3 years
Plum Analytics
Actions (login required)
View Item |