Mizrahi, Moti (2020) Is Truth the Gold Standard of Inquiry? A Comment on Elgin’s Argument against Veritism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In True Enough, Catherine Elgin (2017) argues against veritism, which is the view that truth is the paramount epistemic objective. Elgin’s argument against veritism proceeds from considering the role that models, idealizations, and thought experiments play in science to the conclusion that veritism is unacceptable. In this commentary, I argue that Elgin’s argument fails as an argument against veritism. I sketch a refutation by logical analogy of Elgin’s argument. Just as one can aim at gold medals and still find approximations to gold, such as silver and bronze medals, to be acceptable and honest achievements in competitive sports, one can aim at full truths as the paramount epistemic objective and still find approximations to truth, such as models and idealizations, to be acceptable and honest achievements in scientific inquiry.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Mizrahi, Moti motimizra@gmail.com
Keywords:	Catherine Elgin; epistemic objective; scientific idealizations; truth; veritism
Subjects:	General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Depositing User:	Dr. Moti Mizrahi
Date Deposited:	01 May 2020 02:49
Last Modified:	01 May 2020 02:49
Item ID:	17130
Subjects:	General Issues > Models and Idealization General Issues > Philosophers of Science General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism
Date:	30 April 2020
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17130

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