Harvard, Stephanie (2020) Representational Risk. In: UNSPECIFIED.

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Abstract

The argument from inductive risk (AIR) is an important challenge to the Value-Free Ideal; yet philosophers disagree over how to define it. We argue that the AIR that best aligns with Rudner's (1953) and Hempel's (1954, 1965) views is the one that describes the risk scientists take in invoking 'facts'. Further, we argue that representational decisions in science necessarily invoke both facts and non-epistemic values and should not be equated with invoking facts; therefore, the AIR should not be applied to representational decisions. Last, we define a 'representational risk', showing how this helps clarify the role of values in science.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Harvard, Stephanie
Keywords:	values in science; inductive risk; representation;
Subjects:	General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Dr. Stephanie Harvard
Date Deposited:	11 Jun 2020 07:03
Last Modified:	11 Jun 2020 07:03
Item ID:	17311
Subjects:	General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	2 March 2020
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17311

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