Roush, Sherrilyn (2003) Positive Relevance Defended. Philosophy of Science, 71 (1). pp. 110-116. ISSN 1539-767X

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Abstract

This paper addresses two examples due to Peter Achinstein purporting to show that the positive relevance view of evidence is too strong, that is, that evidence need not raise the probability of what it is evidence for. The first example can work only if it makes a false assumption. The second example fails because what Achinstein claims is evidence is redundant with information we already have. Without these examples Achinstein is left without motivation for his account of evidence, which uses the concept of explanation in addition to that of probability.

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Item Type:	Published Article or Volume
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Roush, Sherrilyn sherri.roush@gmail.com
Keywords:	confirmation, evidence, explanation, probabilistic relevance
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence
Depositing User:	Sherrilyn Roush
Date Deposited:	30 Jun 2020 02:06
Last Modified:	30 Jun 2020 02:06
Item ID:	17394
Journal or Publication Title:	Philosophy of Science
Publisher:	University of Chicago Press
Official URL:	https://doi.org/10.1086/381416
DOI or Unique Handle:	10.1086/381416
Subjects:	General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence
Date:	2003
Page Range:	pp. 110-116
Volume:	71
Number:	1
ISSN:	1539-767X
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/17394

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