San Pedro, Iñaki
(2020)
Degrees of Epistemic Opacity.
[Preprint]
Abstract
The paper analyses in some depth the distinction by Paul Humphreys between "epistemic opacity" —which I refer to as "weak epistemic opacity" here— and "essential epistemic opacity", and defends the idea that epistemic opacity in general can be made sense as coming in degrees. The idea of degrees of epistemic opacity is then exploited to show, in the context of computer simulations, the tight relation between the concept of epistemic opacity and actual scientific (modelling and simulation) practices. As a consequence, interesting questions arise in connection with the role of agents dealing with epistemically opaque processes such as computer simulations.
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Degrees of Epistemic Opacity. (deposited 20 Jul 2020 15:35)
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