Whitcomb, Dennis (2004) Kitcher, Correspondence, and Success. UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)
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Abstract
Concerned that deflationary theories of truth threaten his scientific realism, Philip Kitcher has constructed an argument that scientific success establishes not only the truth of crucial scientific beliefs but also their *correspondence* truth. This paper interprets and evaluates Kitcher’s argument, ultimately finding it to be both unsound and unmotivated.
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| Item Type: | Other | ||||||
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| Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Depositing User: | Dennis Whitcomb | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 31 May 2004 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 07 Oct 2010 15:12 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 1776 | ||||||
| Public Domain: | No | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Explanation General Issues > Realism/Anti-realism |
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| Date: | 2004 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1776 |
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