Bartha, Paul
(2020)
Norton's material theory of analogy.
In: UNSPECIFIED.
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Abstract
In his book, The Material Theory of Induction, Norton argues that the quest for a universal formal theory or ‘schema’ for analogical inference should be abandoned. In
its place, he offers the “material theory of analogy”: each analogical inference is “powered” by a local fact of analogy rather than by any formal schema. His minimalist
model promises a straightforward, fact-based approach to the evaluation and justification of analogical inferences. This paper argues that although the rejection of
universal schemas is justified, Norton’s positive theory is limited in scope: it works well only for a restricted class of analogical inferences. Both facts and quasi-formal
criteria have roles to play in a theory of analogical reasoning.
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