Desmond, Hugh (2020) Incentivizing Replication is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Philosophers of science and meta-scientists alike now typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit maximization. In this paper I argue that this modeling assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative implication of this is that science policy should not only focus on incentive reform.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Replication Crisis; Scientific Methodology; Social Structure of Science; Incentives; Trust | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Values In Science |
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| Depositing User: | Prof. Dr. Hugh Desmond | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 26 Sep 2020 20:59 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 26 Sep 2020 20:59 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 18145 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Ethical Issues General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Social Epistemology of Science General Issues > Values In Science |
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| Date: | March 2020 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18145 |
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