Kubiak, Adam P. and Kawalec, Paweł (2021) The Epistemic Consequences of Pragmatic Value-Laden Scientific Inference. [Preprint]

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Abstract

In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses (N-P) by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the replicability of experiments in terms of the indirect aspect and the replicability of outcomes in terms of the direct aspect. We argue that the influence of pragmatic values is beneficial to N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability indirectly. We show that while the direct influence of pragmatic values can be beneficial, its negative effects on reliability and replicability are also unavoidable in some cases, with the direct and indirect aspects possibly being incongruent.

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Item Type:	Preprint
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Kubiak, Adam P. adampkubiak@gmail.com 0000-0001-7178-3784 Kawalec, Paweł pawel.kawalec@kul.pl 0000-0001-7618-8298
Keywords:	frequentism; error; statistical tests; epistemic reliability; replication; values
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Values In Science
Depositing User:	Adam Kubiak
Date Deposited:	10 Mar 2021 03:03
Last Modified:	10 Mar 2021 03:03
Item ID:	18791
Subjects:	Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Values In Science
Date:	9 March 2021
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/18791

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• The Epistemic Consequences of Pragmatic Value-Laden Scientific Inference. (deposited 10 Mar 2021 03:03) [Currently Displayed]
  • The Epistemic Consequences of Pragmatic Value-Laden Scientific Inference. (deposited 22 May 2021 21:46)

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