Md Amin, Mohamed Eusuff
(2020)
Simple Logical Proposition for Cartesian Dualism.
[Preprint]
Abstract
In this essay, we will investigate how the mind works to understand a sentence naturally, and its
implication on the philosophy of mind. When a vague sentence is given to us, we ought to understand
it in a certain way naturally. The question we put forward here is, why it is so, and how? Given that we
able to understand the language (or sentence) without being limited to the sensible elements of the
language, this suggests that the intelligible elements of the language is perceived by the mind. However,
critics of Cartesian dualism argue that the concept of mind is a language problem. Their conclusion
suggests that logic could not able to prove the existence of the mind. However, in this essay, we will
see that, the logical mechanism in language is not limited to one proposition at its syntax. Because we
able to understand a vague sentence in a certain way naturally, this suggests that the mind performs
complex logical computation to reach that ‘natural understanding’ of the vague sentence – (which is
more than one logical proposition). Because of such computation is possible, we argued that the innate
knowledge is necessary.
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