Potochnik, Angela
(2011)
Explanation and Understanding: An Alternative to Strevens' Depth.
[Preprint]
Abstract
In Depth (2009), Michael Strevens offers an account of causal explanation according to which explanatory practice is shaped by counterbalanced commitments to representing causal influence and abstracting away from overly specific details. Here I outline Strevens’ approach to event explanation and raise one concern with that account. I argue that what Strevens calls explanatory frameworks figure prominently in explanatory practice because, contrary to Strevens’ view, they actually improve explanations. This suggestion is simple but has far-reaching implications. It affects the status of explanations that cite multiply realizable properties; the explanatory role of causal factors with small effect; and Strevens’ titular explanatory virtue, depth. This results in greater coherence with explanatory practice and accords with the emphasis that Strevens places on explanatory patterns. Ultimately, my suggestion preserves a tight connection between explanation and the creation of understanding.
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