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Defending the motivational theory of desire

Pineda-Oliva, David (2021) Defending the motivational theory of desire. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 36 (2). pp. 243-260. ISSN 2171-679X

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Abstract

In this paper I offer a defense of the motivational theory of desire. According to the motivational view, a desire is basically a disposition to bring about the desire’s content. First, I argue that two rival views on the nature of desire, the evaluative theory and the deontic theory, fall prey to the problem of the death of desire and that, when one tries to develop a plausible version of these theories which is able to overcome this problem, one ends up with a view that is not relevantly different from the evaluative view. Second, I respond to some objections to the claim that motivations are sufficient for desire, namely, the Radioman objection and the objection that some motivational states like intentions and habits are not desires.


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Item Type: Published Article or Volume
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Pineda-Oliva, Daviddavid.pineda@udg.edu0000-0002-2505-7551
Additional Information: ISSN: 0495-4548 (print)
Keywords: desires, motivational theory of desire, evaluative theory of desire, deontic view of desire, death of desire, intentions, habits.
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Depositing User: Unnamed user with email theoria@ehu.es
Date Deposited: 03 Jun 2021 14:15
Last Modified: 03 Jun 2021 14:15
Item ID: 19141
Journal or Publication Title: THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science
Publisher: Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea / Universidad del País Vasco
Official URL: https://ojs.ehu.eus/index.php/THEORIA/article/view...
DOI or Unique Handle: 10.1387/theoria.21489
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Psychology > Judgment and Decision Making
General Issues > Structure of Theories
Date: May 2021
Page Range: pp. 243-260
Volume: 36
Number: 2
ISSN: 2171-679X
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19141

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