Fletcher, Samuel C. (2021) The Role of Replication in Psychological Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 11 (23). pp. 1-19.
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Abstract
The replication or reproducibility crisis in psychological science has renewed attention to philosophical aspects of its methodology. I provide herein a new, functional account of the role of replication in a scientific discipline: to undercut the underdetermination of scientific hypotheses from data, typically by hypotheses that connect data with phenomena. These include hypotheses that concern sampling error, experimental control, and operationalization. How a scientific hypothesis could be underdetermined in one of these ways depends on a scientific discipline's epistemic goals, theoretical development, material constraints, institutional context, and their interconnections. I illustrate how these apply to the case of psychological science. I then contrast this "bottom-up" account with "top-down" accounts, which assume that the role of replication in a particular science, such as psychology, must follow from a uniform role that it plays in science generally. Aside from avoiding unaddressed problems with top-down accounts, my bottom-up account also better explains the variability of importance of replication of various types across different scientific disciplines.
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| Item Type: | Published Article or Volume | ||||||
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| Keywords: | Replication, Psychology, Underdetermination, Confirmation, Lakatos, Reproducibility | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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| Depositing User: | Prof. Samuel C. Fletcher | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 20 Jun 2021 04:09 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 20 Jun 2021 04:09 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 19193 | ||||||
| Journal or Publication Title: | European Journal for Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Publisher: | Springer | ||||||
| Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13194-0... | ||||||
| DOI or Unique Handle: | 10.1007/s13194-020-00329-2 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Evidence General Issues > Experimentation Specific Sciences > Psychology General Issues > Theory/Observation |
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| Date: | 8 January 2021 | ||||||
| Page Range: | pp. 1-19 | ||||||
| Volume: | 11 | ||||||
| Number: | 23 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19193 |
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