Henschen, Tobias (2021) How strong is the argument from inductive risk? [Preprint]
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Abstract
The argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and others, famously concludes that the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments. The paper aims to show that trust in the soundness of the argument is overrated – that philosophers who endorse its conclusion (especially Douglas and Wilholt) fail to refute two of the most important objections that have been raised to its soundness: Jeffrey’s objection that the genuine task of the scientist is to assign probabilities to (and not to accept or reject) hypotheses, and Levi’s objection that the argument is ambiguous about decisions about how to act and decisions about what to believe, that only the former presuppose value judgments, and that qua scientist, the scientist only needs to decide what to believe.
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| Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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| Additional Information: | To appear in European Journal for Philosophy of Science | ||||||
| Keywords: | value judgments, inductive risk, hypothesis acceptance, probability assignments, Higgs boson discovery, science with non-epistemic impact | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Values In Science |
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| Depositing User: | Tobias Henschen | ||||||
| Date Deposited: | 12 Aug 2021 03:14 | ||||||
| Last Modified: | 12 Aug 2021 03:14 | ||||||
| Item ID: | 19430 | ||||||
| Subjects: | General Issues > Confirmation/Induction General Issues > Philosophers of Science Specific Sciences > Probability/Statistics General Issues > Science and Policy General Issues > Values In Science |
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| Date: | 10 August 2021 | ||||||
| URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19430 |
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