Van Dyck, Maarten (2004) The Paradox of Conceptual Novelty and Galileo’s Use of Experiments. In: UNSPECIFIED. (Unpublished)

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Abstract

Starting with a discussion of what I call Koyré’s paradox of conceptual novelty, I introduce the ideas of Damerow et al. on the establishment of classical mechanics in Galileo’s work. I then argue that although the view of Damerow et al. on the nature of Galileo’s conceptual innovation is convincing, it misses an essential element: Galileo’s use of the experiments described in the first day of the Two New Sciences. I describe these experiments and analyze their function. Central to my analysis is the idea that Galileo’s pendulum experiments serve to secure the reference of his theoretical models in actually occurring cases of free fall. In this way Galileo’s experiments constitute an essential part of the meaning of the new concepts of classical mechanics.

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Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (UNSPECIFIED)
Creators:	Creators Email ORCID Van Dyck, Maarten
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
Depositing User:	Maarten Van Dyck
Date Deposited:	17 Sep 2004
Last Modified:	07 Oct 2010 15:12
Item ID:	1961
Public Domain:	No
Subjects:	General Issues > History of Philosophy of Science General Issues > Experimentation General Issues > History of Science Case Studies
Date:	2004
URI:	https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/1961

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