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Habits in Perception: A Diachronic Defence of Hyperinferentialism

Legg, Catherine (2021) Habits in Perception: A Diachronic Defence of Hyperinferentialism. [Preprint]

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Abstract

Interesting parallels exist between the inferentialism developed and defended by Robert Brandom, and classical pragmatist Charles Peirce's resolute denial that perceptual 'intuition' should play any role in epistemology. In a 2008 paper I explored this, urging Brandom to 'go for gold' and embrace the hyperinferentialism that he sees as a step too far. But in that paper I relied exclusively on Peirce's anti-Cartesian writings of the 1860s.

Here I extend my discussion to Peirce's apparently quite different theory of perception from 1902-3. I argue that despite the apparent differences, Peirce remains a hyperinferentialist, and his view remains an attractive alternative to Brandom's 'merely strong' inferentialism. My argument turns on an examination of how Peirce understands concepts diachronically, as habits of associating certain icons with certain real-world indices. As the icons (in Kantian terms: schemata) are repeatedly used, they transform from pictures to predicates.


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Item Type: Preprint
Creators:
CreatorsEmailORCID
Legg, Catherinec.legg@deakin.edu.au0000-0002-0231-5415
Additional Information: This paper has been written for a chapter in a book on habit through the history of philosophy, ed. Jeremy Dunham (Durham) and Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (Sheffield). It is not yet peer-reviewed.
Keywords: perception, cognition, Peirce, Brandom, inferentialism, hyperinferentialism, percept, icon, index, symbol
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Depositing User: Dr Catherine Legg
Date Deposited: 14 Oct 2021 01:24
Last Modified: 14 Oct 2021 01:24
Item ID: 19683
Subjects: Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations
Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception
Date: October 2021
URI: https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19683

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