Legg, Catherine (2021) Habits in Perception: A Diachronic Defence of Hyperinferentialism. [Preprint]
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Abstract
Interesting parallels exist between the inferentialism developed and defended by Robert Brandom, and classical pragmatist Charles Peirce's resolute denial that perceptual 'intuition' should play any role in epistemology. In a 2008 paper I explored this, urging Brandom to 'go for gold' and embrace the hyperinferentialism that he sees as a step too far. But in that paper I relied exclusively on Peirce's anti-Cartesian writings of the 1860s.
Here I extend my discussion to Peirce's apparently quite different theory of perception from 1902-3. I argue that despite the apparent differences, Peirce remains a hyperinferentialist, and his view remains an attractive alternative to Brandom's 'merely strong' inferentialism. My argument turns on an examination of how Peirce understands concepts diachronically, as habits of associating certain icons with certain real-world indices. As the icons (in Kantian terms: schemata) are repeatedly used, they transform from pictures to predicates.
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Item Type: | Preprint | ||||||
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Additional Information: | This paper has been written for a chapter in a book on habit through the history of philosophy, ed. Jeremy Dunham (Durham) and Komarine Romdenh-Romluc (Sheffield). It is not yet peer-reviewed. | ||||||
Keywords: | perception, cognition, Peirce, Brandom, inferentialism, hyperinferentialism, percept, icon, index, symbol | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception |
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Depositing User: | Dr Catherine Legg | ||||||
Date Deposited: | 14 Oct 2021 01:24 | ||||||
Last Modified: | 14 Oct 2021 01:24 | ||||||
Item ID: | 19683 | ||||||
Subjects: | Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Concepts and Representations Specific Sciences > Cognitive Science > Perception |
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Date: | October 2021 | ||||||
URI: | https://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/19683 |
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